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In the debate over testimony to miracles, a 
common Humean move is to emphasize the prior 
improbability of miracles as the most important 
epistemic factor. Robert Fogelin uses the example 
of Henry, who tells multiple tall tales about meeting 
celebrities, to argue that low prior probabilities 
alone can render testimony unbelievable, with 
obvious implications for testimony to miracles. A 
detailed Bayesian analysis of Henry’s stories shows 
instead that the fact that Henry tells multiple stories 
about events that occurred independently if they 
occurred at all is crucial to his loss of credibility. 
Th e epistemic structure is similar to that of a case 
of multiple lottery wins by the same person. Each 
of Henry’s stories can confi rm only one event, but 
all the stories confi rm the hypothesis that Henry is 
a liar. Th is structure does not apply to testimony to 
just one event, however antecedently improbable. 
Such examples therefore do nothing to undermine 
a standard Bayesian analysis involving both priors 
and likelihoods in evaluating testimony to an 
improbable event.
Keywords: Bayesian probability, miracles, lotter-
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1. Prior Probabilities and Testimony to 
Miracles
Ever since David Hume delivered in Of 
Miracles what he called an “everlasting 
check to all kinds of superstitious 
delusion” (Hume 1748/2000, 83), a major 
focus in the dismissal of testimony to the 
miraculous has been the established prior 
improbability of miracles. Hume set the 
stage by example:
A miracle is a violation 
of the laws of nature; 
and as a fi rm and 
unalterable experience 
has established these 
laws, the proof against 
a miracle, from the very 
nature of the fact, is as 
entire as any argument 
from experience can 
possibly be imagined. 
(Hume 1748/2000, 
86-7)
And he was not shy about drawing 
conclusions about the implications for 
testimony to the miraculous:
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When anyone tells me, that he saw a dead man restored to life, I 
immediately consider with myself whether it be more probable, that 
this person should either deceive or be deceived, or that the fact, 
which he relates, should really have happened. I weigh the one miracle 
against the other; and according to the superiority, which I discover, 
I pronounce my decision, and always reject the greater miracle. If the 
falsehood of his testimony would be more miraculous, than the event 
which he relates; then, and not till then, can he pretend to demand 
my belief or opinion. (Hume 1748/2000, 87-8)
Nor is there any question as to whether Hume thought that such a burden of “greater 
miraculousness” would ever be discharged. Th e Marquis de Laplace put the Humean 
point more pithily, though with less nuance: “Th ere are things so extraordinary,” he 
said, “that nothing can balance their improbability”. (Laplace 1840/1951, 119)1 
In contemporary times, J. L. Mackie has defended the general Humean position, 
while considering that Hume’s case needs to be improved upon at points. Mackie 
emphasizes the impact of one’s prior theistic or atheistic beliefs on the credibility of 
miracle claims.
[W]e should distinguish two diff erent contexts in which an alleged 
miracle might be discussed. One possible context would be where the 
parties in debate already both accept some general theistic doctrines, 
and the point at issue is whether a miracle has occurred which would 
enhance the authority of a specifi c sect or teacher. In this context 
supernatural intervention, though prima facie unlikely on any 
particular occasion, is, generally speaking, on the cards: ...But it is a 
very diff erent matter if the context is that of fundamental debate about 
the truth of theism itself. Here one party to the debate is initially at 
least agnostic, and does not yet concede that there is a supernatural 
power at all. From this point of view the intrinsic improbability of a 
genuine miracle ... is very great, and one or other of the alternative 
explanations...will always be much more likely – that is, either that 
the alleged event is not miraculous, or that it did not occur, that the 
testimony is faulty in some way.
 Th is entails that it is pretty well impossible that reported 
miracles should provide a worthwhile argument for theism addressed 
to those who are initially inclined to atheism or even to agnosticism. 
1  I do not mean to enter into the purely historical controversy over whether a full Bayesian reconstruction of Hume's 
position is true to Hume's intentions, which would lie beyond the scope of this paper. My intent is to connect the 
discussion here to its context in the philosophy of religion and to show that Humeans such as Mackie and Fogelin who 
emphasize the antecedent improbability of miracles – which Bayesians would refer to as a low prior probability – are 
following the general trend of Hume's thought. For strenuous objections to any Bayesian modeling of Hume's argu-
ment, see Levine (2010). For a diff erent view, see Earman. (2000, 43-8)
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... Not only are such reports unable to carry any rational conviction on 
their own, but also they are unable even to contribute independently 
to the kind of accumulation or battery of arguments referred to in the 
Introduction. To this extent Hume is right, despite the inaccuracies 
we have found in his statement of the case. (Mackie 1982, 27)
More recently, authors such as Rodney Holder (1998, 52ff ) and John Earman (2000, 
53-64), using the tools of Bayesian analysis, have shown that the Humean approach is 
facile, since any fi nite prior probability, however low, can in principle be overcome by 
testimonial evidence. Earman’s conclusion is withering:
In “Of Miracles,” Hume pretends to stand on philosophical high 
ground, hurling down thunderbolts against miracle stories. Th e 
thunderbolts are supposed to issue from general principles about 
inductive inference and the credibility of eyewitness testimony. But 
when these principles are made explicit and examined under the lens 
of Bayesianism, they are found to be either vapid, specious, or at 
variance with actual scientifi c practice. (Earman 2000, 70)
Yet it may seem that the Bayesian analysis must be missing something. It seems 
reasonable for Mackie to suggest that our independent evidence that some type of 
event is not “on the cards” plays a huge role in our evaluation of specifi c evidence 
that seems to favor the event. In charity, we should assume that Mackie means us to 
take it that the atheist or agnostic is an atheist or agnostic for reasons and not merely 
arbitrarily. And if this is so, then such a person has ipso facto reason to believe that 
miracles do not happen and reason to conclude that any testimony to the miraculous 
is “faulty in some way.” We do sometimes, with apparently ample justifi cation, dismiss 
evidence to a highly improbable event. Hume expressed this intuition when he wrote 
impatiently to Hugh Blair, “Does a man of sense run after every silly tale of witches or 
hobgoblins or fairies, and canvass particularly the evidence?” (Earman 2000, 59)
Th is intuition is further strengthened by the way that prior improbability reasonably 
aff ects our on-going estimate of the reliability of a witness. Would we not be inclined 
in some cases to think less of the messenger’s veracity rather than accepting his story? 
Are there not cases in which the very fact that a witness says that a highly improbable 
event took place causes us to think that he is, at least in this instance, a liar or a 
practical joker? And if so, does this not mean that the testimony, rather than supporting 
the occurrence of the event, merely refl ects negatively on the person who gives it? 
Th ere might, in some cases, be reference class reasons that would limit the impact of a 
given tall tale on our evaluation of the person’s general truthfulness; for example, if we 
suspect that he is playing a practical joke in connection with a birthday party, we will 
not conclude from this that he is likely to tell falsehoods in more sober contexts. But 
we can also imagine many plausible circumstances in which even a single instance of 
apparent lying, leg-pulling, or even credulity from a given witness will be negatively 
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relevant to our evaluation of his later testimony. One cannot help wondering whether 
this impact of testimony to the improbable – leading us to wonder whether the witness 
is less level-headed or straightforward than we had previously thought – means that the 
Humeans are onto something.
2. Fogelin, Henry, and Tall Tales
In A Defense of Hume on Miracles, Robert Fogelin attempts to press the intuition in 
support of Hume’s dismissal of testimony to the miraculous. Fogelin argues that there 
is a “reverse method” for evaluating testimony in which the eff ect of the testimony is 
to cause us reasonably to re-evaluate downwards our estimate of the witness’s reliability 
rather than being moved to accept his story. 
If a person we take to be reliable tells us that a common sort of event 
has occurred, trusting to his reliability, we usually accept his report 
without hesitation. If, however, the very same person tells us that a 
perfectly fantastic event has occurred, we may then move in the other 
direction and reconsider our belief in his reliability. (Fogelin 2003, 
10)
According to Fogelin, the diff erence between an ordinary case in which we accept 
testimony and a case in which we use the reverse method to dismiss testimony and 
reevaluate witness reliability lies entirely in the improbability of the event attested to. 
To see how these methods [the direct and reverse method] function 
in an ordinary, nonphilosophical, context, consider a report from a 
“normally reliable source” that President George W. Bush has been 
observed walking a tightrope over his swimming pool. Most people’s 
initial reaction would be justifi ed disbelief. Th e sheer bizarreness and 
improbability of such an event’s taking place cast immediate doubt on 
the force of the testimony off ered in its behalf. It seems more reasonable 
to treat the report as a hoax or perhaps as a misunderstanding of 
a political metaphor. Th is is a simple and I believe uncontroversial 
example of the reverse method at work. (Fogelin 2003, 10)
Fogelin does admit that the story of President Bush’s tightrope walking might in the 
end be reasonably accepted if it were performed not only before witnesses but also 
before a video camera. But if the report were of a miracle, things would be diff erent, 
and the reverse method would have to be applied to the testimony because of the 
improbability of the event:
[I]nstead of being told that [Bush] tightrope-walked across his pool, 
we are told that he walked across the surface of the water. Surely 
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we now have a story even more improbable than the original. ...[I]t 
would still be wrong to assign a probability of 0 to its occurrence. It 
is, however, a moral certainty – something amounting to a proof in 
Hume’s use of this term – that no such event occurred. Given this, it 
would be perfectly reasonable to dismiss out of hand the testimony 
brought forward in its behalf. (Fogelin 2003, 12-3)
Fogelin argues in favor of his “reverse method” for evaluating testimony to the miraculous 
by way of the interesting example of a hypothetical raconteur named Henry.
Henry...is full of stories about famous people he has met under unusual 
circumstances. Browsing in a bookstore in Greenwich Village, whom 
does he bump into but Woody Allen, thumbing through a copy of 
Baudelaire’s poetry? ... Flying to London, whom does he fi nd sitting 
next to him but Desmond Tutu? ... He was stuck in an elevator with 
Cindy Crawford. He fell in with Osama bin Laden at (of all places) a 
disco in Beirut. Th e list of such remarkable meetings runs on and on, 
including encounters with Oprah Winfrey, Mother Teresa, Donald 
Trump, Stephen Hawking, Mikhail Baryshnikov, and each of the last 
three popes. For years, Henry has enthralled (or bemused) dinner 
companions with stories of this kind.
What are we to think of Henry and his stories? If we look at them 
individually, and if we have no prior reason to distrust Henry, his 
stories may strike us as remarkable, but still believable. ... What seems 
highly implausible is that Henry could have been involved in all (or 
even most) of these encounters. As the list gets longer and longer, 
we move into the area of the utterly implausible and our opinion of 
the credibility of Henry’s testimony correspondingly sinks. ... As a 
result, we will not credit any single one of [the stories] if we have only 
Henry’s word to go on. (Fogelin 2003, 11)
Th e intended application to the case of miracles is obvious: Fogelin uses the 
multiplication of Henry’s stories merely as a way to generate a low prior probability for 
the truth of the conjunction of all of Henry’s stories. He intends, therefore, to argue a 
la Hume that if the probability of some proposition is “too low,” a witness’s testimony 
to it should cause us to conclude that the witness is lying (or was duped, or has some 
other problem that makes him unreliable) rather than that the event took place.
Th is account of Henry and his stories is important for the following 
reason: It shows that the application of the reverse method depends 
upon the improbability that an event, or set of events could occur. In 
this case, the extreme improbability that troubles us arises through the 
joint assertion of events that, taken individually, are not suffi  ciently 
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improbable to trouble us. Such an extreme improbability can arise in 
other ways as well. In the application of the reverse test of testimony, 
it is the extreme improbability, not its source, that matters. ...[I]f the 
reverse method is suffi  cient for dismissing Henry’s testimony, it is hard 
to see how it cannot be at least as applicable to reports of miracles. 
Th ere is certainly no reason for being more tolerant of testimony 
concerning miracles than we are of Henry’s reports. (Fogelin 2003, 
12-3)
But Fogelin is wrong. Th e specifi cs of the Henry case are important to understanding 
the example correctly, and there is more to such a case than merely a low prior 
probability for the conjunction of all the stories. A Bayesian analysis explains both why 
it is reasonable in the Henry case to discount his testimony after he has told a number 
of such stories and also why the correct intuition in that case cannot be ported over to 
a single testimony to an event with a low prior probability.
3. Prior and likelihood – P-inductive and C-inductive
Th e fi rst distinction we must make in analyzing any case of this kind is between 
the prior probability of a theory and the likelihood of a theory vis a vis a body of 
evidence. Th e prior probability of an hypothesis is, of course, the probability of that 
theory conditional on all evidence available to the subject other than the specifi c bit 
of evidence E whose impact we are considering. Th e likelihood of the hypothesis vis a 
vis E is the probability of E given the hypothesis. Th e Bayes factor is the ratio of the 
likelihoods of H and ~H for some E,
P (E|H)
P (E|~H),
and is a measure of the evidential impact of E upon H and ~H. 
A Bayes factor that favors H will at least partially off set a low prior probability for H. 
For example, suppose that the prior probability of some scientifi c hypothesis H is .1 
but that we make an observation, evidence E, which favors H by a ratio of 10 to 1. In 
other words, evidence E is ten times more probable if H is the case than if it is not. 
Here, the prior improbability of H is exactly balanced by the Bayes factor (that is, by 
the impact of E), which means that the posterior probability of H after we take E into 
account has risen to .5.
Th is distinction between priors and likelihoods is directly relevant to the further 
important distinction between what Richard Swinburne (2004, 6) calls a P-inductive 
argument and a C-inductive argument. If a theory H gives higher conditional probability 
to some piece of evidence E than ~H gives to E, then conditioning on E confi rms H. 
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A C-inductive argument for H is just an argument that confi rms H to some extent or 
other, giving H a higher probability than it would have had without that argument. 
But evidence E may not, of course, confi rm H suffi  ciently to overwhelm a low prior 
probability for H, so the argument from E may not be P-inductive – that is, it may 
not raise the probability of H above .5. And in that case, a fortiori it will not lead one 
actually to believe H, since usually one would assume that evidence suffi  cient for belief 
must raise the probability of an event to something even better than merely “above 
.5.” In the case of a story regarding some event with a low prior probability, a witness’s 
testimony can easily be C-inductive but not P-inductive. Th e testimony may raise the 
probability that the event happened even though, because of the existence of other, 
contrary evidence, one still does not believe nor even consider believing that the event 
happened.
Fogelin clearly wants to say that an extremely low prior probability for some event 
renders the testimony of a witness to the event unbelievable, but he does nothing to tell 
us why his “reverse method” is supposed to work in terms of probability. In particular, 
he does not tell us whether, when we conclude that a witness is not telling the truth 
(and hence question the witness’s reliability more than we did before), this means that 
the witness’s testimony has no force in favor of the event or merely that it does not have 
enough force to overcome the low prior probability of the event. Fogelin’s use of such 
phrases as “move in the other direction” and “cast immediate doubt on the force of 
the testimony” as well as his implication that we should never be able to be convinced 
that a man walked on the water seem to imply that the argument in such a case is not 
C-inductive merely because of the low prior probability of the event. But a low prior 
probability for the event to which a witness testifi es cannot by itself guarantee that the 
witness’s testimony is not C-inductive.2
Fogelin’s inexplicitness on this point may arise from an understandable confusion: 
He may assume, though he does not say so, that if some testimony tends to confi rm 
the proposition that there is something wrong with the witness (that he is lying or 
has been duped, for example), it cannot also confi rm the occurrence of the event. 
Th at assumption would also explain his use of the phrase “reverse method” for the 
case in which we revise downward our estimate of a witness’s reliability as a result of 
his testimony. But such an assumption regarding confi rmation is false. It is, in fact, 
possible for both of two mutually exclusive propositions to be confi rmed by a given 
piece of evidence, so long as they are not jointly exhaustive. 
Consider, for example, the following disjunctive proposition: 
2  On p. 7, Fogelin appears to allow that testimony to at least some improbable events has at least some force when 
he says that "the improbability of the event's occurring gives us some (though perhaps not decisive) grounds for chal-
lenging the force of the testimony." Even here, the phrase "challenging the force" is odd and confusing, and Fogelin's 
contrast elsewhere between the miraculous and non-miraculous scenarios seems to indicate that in all such cases the 
"challenge to the force of the testimony" should be taken to be "decisive" merely because of the low prior probability 
of the event.
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D: Either event A happened, or event A did not happen and the witness is a liar. 
Th ese alternatives are mutually exclusive but are not jointly exhaustive before we 
condition upon the evidence of the witness’s testimony. Obviously, before we receive 
that testimony, a fairly large slice of probability goes to the negation of D – that is, 
to the proposition that the low-probability event did not take place and also that the 
witness is not a liar. In fact, that is the default assumption. One does not usually 
get up on a particular day thinking either that a friend is a liar or that some highly 
extraordinary event has taken place which he has witnessed. One assumes that neither 
of these is true, and for that very reason one does not expect to receive testimony to 
an extraordinary type of event. If, for simplicity’s sake, we give zero probability, given 
~D, to our receiving the witness’s testimony, then ~D will be incompatible with the 
testimony and will disappear once we condition on the testimony. But the probability 
of both the hypothesis that the witness is a liar (and the event did not occur) and the 
hypothesis that the event did occur can rise as a result of that conditioning step – they 
can both be, as it were, the benefi ciaries when we conclude that ~D must be false. 
Th erefore, even if we must reevaluate the witness’s reliability as a result of the testimony, 
it does not follow that the testimony does nothing to confi rm the occurrence of the 
event.
4. Th e correct probabilistic analysis of the Henry case
Nonetheless, it does seem that after Henry has told story after story, we should in the 
end come to discount his testimony in the more thoroughgoing sense of not allowing it 
to confi rm (or at least scarcely allowing it to confi rm) the actual occurrence of further 
celebrity encounters. Is this intuition correct? And if it is, is the reason simply that 
adding many encounters dramatically lowers the probability of the conjunction of all 
of the encounters? 
Th e intuition about eventually discounting Henry’s testimony is correct. But a focus 
on the low prior probability of the conjunction alone will be misleading as to the real 
explanation for Henry’s loss of credibility.
Let us model the Henry case by plugging in some concrete numbers. Suppose that the 
prior probability for each of the encounters Henry mentions is .01. Th is may be high 
for some of the stories and low for others, but for simplicity we will treat all the stories 
as if they each had the same relatively low but not extraordinarily low prior probability. 
Let L stand for “Henry is an extravagant liar.” Let A stand for “Henry met celebrity A,” 
B stand for “Henry met celebrity B,” and so forth, where “met” includes the details that 
Henry gives. In other words, A, B, and C stand for events that would, if they occurred, 
make Henry’s stories true. Let EA be the evidence of Henry’s telling his fi rst story – that 
is, of Henry’s saying that A, EB be the evidence of Henry’s saying that B, and so forth. 
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We will suppose, moreover, that the prior probability that Henry is an extravagant liar 
is independent of the probability that these things have really happened to him. Th at 
is to say, if such things do occasionally happen to someone, there is no prior reason 
to regard them as more or less likely to happen to someone who is inclined to tell 
extravagant lies than to a generally truthful person. To model this independence, we 
will take it that the prior probability of Henry’s being a liar is .01 and that all priors 
that involve conjunctions with “Henry is a liar” or “Henry is not a liar” are calculated 
by multiplying individual priors. Hence, before Henry tells a story, the probability that 
he is a liar by nature but that the event in question did actually take place is .0001 (that 
is, .01 x .01). Th is small amount of probability is included in the .01 prior probability 
that the event (for example, A) took place. Th e prior probability that the event took 
place (which has an individual prior probability of .01) and that Henry is not a liar 
(which has an individual prior probability of .99) is .0099 (i.e., .01 x .99). And so 
forth. Th e prior probability that he is not a liar and that such an encounter has not 
taken place is, as we might expect, the highest of all, being .9801.
For simplicity, we will take it that the probability that Henry testifi es to some event 
given both that the event did not take place and that Henry is not a liar is 0. Th is 
assumption is rendered more plausible if we take it that “liar” is shorthand for any of 
a number of possible scenarios – Henry’s being a liar motivated by vanity, a practical 
joker who intends to enlighten people much later, an otherwise apparently sane maniac, 
a philosopher testing people’s credulity, or anything of the kind. And let us treat the 
probability that Henry tells a story given either that he is a liar or that the event did 
take place as .8.
A word is in order about these numbers. I am assuming that the worst thing that 
happens to Henry for lying is exactly the kind of thing Fogelin describes: Namely, 
his friends will conclude that there is something wrong with him. Hence we have the 
high probability (.8) that if he is the kind of person inclined to tell fantastic lies (for 
whatever reason) he will tell these sorts of fantastic lies to his friends at parties.3 One 
can imagine situations in which even a liar is sobered and moved to be truthful, but in 
our society we do not stone practical jokers or crucify them. Th e total prior probability 
that Henry is a liar assigned here (.01) is fairly low, but so, too, is the probability of 
meeting Osama bin Laden at a disco in Beirut. It may, in fact, be somewhat favorable 
to the bin Laden story to make its probability equal to that of Henry’s being such a liar. 
Th e numbers assigned are intended chiefl y for the sake of concreteness, but they do not 
seem wildly faulty, especially when viewed comparatively.
If we begin iterating conditioning steps on stories (see Table 1), labeling the stories EA, 
EB, and EC, where EA is Henry’s testimony to celebrity encounter A, EB to encounter B, 
3  One objection to this high likelihood is that Henry is not likely to say, e.g., that he has met Bin Laden at some given 
time, since there are many possible lies he could tell about meeting celebrities. But Fogelin implies that we have known 
Henry for quite some time and have had opportunities to hear many stories. Th erefore, we are not simply considering 
the probability of his telling a given story at one point in time. Th e .8 likelihood also accords well with the intuition 
that, if Henry really is an attention-seeking liar, this constitutes a good explanation for his stories.
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and so forth, we fi nd that, at the fi rst conditioning step, the probability of encounter 
A is signifi cantly confi rmed and ends up as just above .5; that posterior probability 
includes the (improbable but possible) sub-hypothesis that Henry is indeed a liar by 
nature, though this particular thing did really happen to him.4 Th is initial probability 
for A after receiving only EA corresponds roughly to Fogelin’s claim that “his stories may 
strike us as remarkable, but still believable.” L itself is also just over .5 probable. Th at 
both A and L are a little more probable than .5 is possible because of that small area of 
possible overlap between them. Th e hypothesis that Henry is a liar and that A did not 
happen now comes in at about .49. As discussed above, Henry’s credibility has been 
called into question, because his being a liar would in this case be a good explanation 
of the evidence, though the probability that the event occurred has also risen.
But as we continue iterating steps of conditioning on similar evidence, we fi nd that 
the confi rmation for the events in question is considerably altered by the addition of 
more stories. After we condition on EB, we fi nd that both event A and event B are now 
only at approximately .02, which is still better than their original .01 but considerably 
4  Th e confi rmation of A to just above .5 can be obtained as follows: Th e prior probability of A is stipulated as .01. 
P(EA|A) is stipulated as .8. Th e regular form of Bayes's Th eorem is P(H|E) = [P(E|H) x P(H)]/ P(E). We can calculate 
P(EA) = P(A) x P(EA|A) + P(~A & ~L) x P(EA|~A & ~L) + P(~A & L) x P(EA|~A & L) = .008 + 0 + .00792 = .01592. 
Plugging this prior and likelihood for A and this prior probability for EA into Bayes's Th eorem yields P*(A) equals ap-
proximately .5025. A similar calculation, mutatis mutandis, yields the same posterior probability for L in this fi rst step. 
It is possible for both L and A to have posterior probabilities over .5 because they are not mutually exclusive.
Table 1 – Some effects of repeated conditioning on Henry’s stories
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A B C A A BAll likelihoods are either 0 or .8. P (E |L) = .8; P(E |L) = .8; P (E |L) = .8; P (E |A) = .8; P (E |~A & ~L) = 0. The same is true mutatis mutandis for E  and B
Cand for E  and C.  Some probabilities are approximate, as noted. Since these are only partial distributions involving approximate probabilities and some
propositions (such as L and A) that are not mutually exclusive, probabilities given do not sum to one.
P: Prior probabilities
P (A) = .01
P (A & L) =.0001
P (L) = .01
P (~A & L) = .0099
P (~A & ~L)=.9801
P*:
AAfter conditioning on E  
P* (A)=just over .5
P*(B) (No evidence yet
from H. about B.) = .01
P*(A &L).005
P* (L)= just over .5
P* (~A & L).4975
P* (~A & ~L) = 0
P* (A & ~L & ~B).49
P* (~A & ~B & L).49
P**:
BAfter conditioning on E  – 
P** (A)  .02
P** (B)  .02
P** (C) (No evidence yet
from H. about C.) = .01
P** (L)  .99
P** (A & ~L & ~B) = 0
P** (~A & ~B & L)  .97
 P***:
CAfter conditioning on E  – H. sa
P***(A) = just over .01
P***(B) = just over .01
P***(C) = just over .01
P***(A & B & C) .0001
P***(L)  .9999
P***(~A & ~B & ~C &L) .97
CE  – H. says that C.– H. says that B.– H. says that A.
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less probable than event A was when Henry had told only one story. Th e reason for 
the disconfi rmation of A by EB and its regression towards its prior probability is fairly 
obvious. Th e probability that A is true, that Henry is not a liar, and that B is false – 
which was a completely live option (at about .49) before conditioning on EB – is now 
0, because it is incompatible with EB. Th is fact makes for signifi cant disconfi rmation 
of A by EB, while L – that Henry is a liar, is becoming more and more probable all the 
time. Indeed, the probability that neither A nor B occurred and that Henry is a liar 
jumps from about .49 to about .97.5 
By the time we condition on a third story, EC, to a third encounter, C, the situation 
Fogelin sketches is emerging clearly. Th e probability of each of A, B, and C is just 
barely higher than its prior of .01. C has received almost no confi rmation from Henry’s 
saying that C occurred. Th e probability that all three stories are false is about .97 and is 
just a tiny bit lower than .99 cubed – the probability that none of the events happened 
before conditioning on any evidence at all. And the probability that Henry is a liar is 
overwhelming, being about .9999. Th e probability that he has lied about at least two of 
the stories (that is, that he is a liar and that at least two stories are false) is over .999.6 
What is happening is clear: As Henry tells more stories and we become more and more 
convinced that he is a liar, we reasonably discount what he says. His stories are losing 
their power to confer confi rmation upon the events to which they attest, since they can 
be just as easily explained by the hypothesis that he is once more lying, which is itself 
now highly probable.
We should be careful not to make the mistake of assuming that the probability that 
all the stories are false will continue to rise indefi nitely with the addition of more 
stories. Even if we were simply considering in the abstract the possibility of Henry’s 
encountering celebrities, without any testimony from him to the eff ect that he had really 
met any celebrities, each such encounter has a non-zero prior probability. Th e more 
such possible encounters we consider, the more likely it is that at least one of them has 
actually taken place by sheer coincidence. On the principle that a stopped clock is right 
twice a day, we should take it that Henry, like anyone else, might occasionally actually 
run into a celebrity by accident, and that in that case he would be likely to tell the story. 
Th is means that the most that can happen as we have a higher and higher probability 
that Henry is a liar is that our posteriors after receiving Henry’s evidence will come, 
in essence, to equal our priors. As more stories are added, the probability that all the 
stories are false will very slowly drop, just as the probability would drop if we multiplied 
.99 (the prior probability that some given story is false) by itself as many times as the 
5  Because of the need to calculate probabilities for such complex hypotheses as (~B & L & A), it is not possible here 
to give many calculations in complete detail, but here is another example at a somewhat greater level of detail than given 
in the text and chart: We can calculate P*(~A & L) using Bayes's Th eorem and the stipulated numbers as approximately 
.4975. (Th e process is similar to that given for calculating P*(A) in footnote 4.) Since B and A are independent, we 
multiply by the .99 probability of ~B in P* to get P*(~B & ~A & L) equals approximately .492525. Giving all sub-
hypotheses their due, we can calculate P*(EB) equals approximately .40598. P*(EB |~B & ~A & L) equals .8, as always. 
Plugging these numbers into Bayes's Th eorem yields P**(~A & ~B & L) equals approximately .97054.
6  Th is last statement, about the probability that Henry has lied about at least two stories, is not represented in Table 
1 for reasons of space.
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number of encounters under consideration. To say this is simply to recognize that, just 
as Fogelin implies, we are moving rapidly toward a situation in which Henry’s celebrity 
stories make no diff erence whatsoever to our beliefs about Henry’s meeting celebrities. 
Th ey become background noise rather than eff ective evidence.
Here we need to recognize something absolutely crucial to the understanding of the 
entire case: L was confi rmed by EA, going from .01 to just over .5. Th at confi rmation 
carries over when we prepare to condition on EB, for it is simply the probability that 
L has after we condition on EA. Hence, L has just over .5 probability even before 
Harry tells his second story, and, with each new story that Henry tells, L is confi rmed 
again. After EB, L is approximately .99, and of course higher still after EC. But there 
is no similar carry-over eff ect to B of the confi rmation that accrues to A from Henry’s 
testimony to A. B, prior to Henry’s story EB, just has the same .01 prior probability 
that any of the celebrity encounters has before we receive testimony about it. Th e fact 
that, after receiving EA, we have more reason to believe A than we had before does not 
mean that we have any more reason to believe B. Th e occurrence of B is independent 
of the occurrence of A. And the same is true of C. Unlike the hypothesis that Henry 
is a liar, which is confi rmed by each of the stories, each celebrity encounter “starts all 
over again” with its own ordinary prior probability, before Henry attests to it. In short, 
Henry’s being a liar explains all of the evidence (EA-EC), but each event’s occurrence 
explains only one part of the evidence. Relatedly, in order to account for the evidence 
on the assumption that Henry is not a liar, we must hypothesize for each story a 
new, independent encounter, so that the only “hypothesis” consistent both with the 
evidence and with Henry’s not being a liar is a conjunction of independent events 
which grows longer each time Henry tells another story.7 Nothing similar is true of 
L, which is able to account for all the stories Henry tells quite well without being 
elaborated in any way.
Th ere is a parallel here to cases involving multiple lotteries. If the hypothesis that the 
lottery is fair does not have a prior probability of 1, a lottery win by N confi rms to 
some degree the theory that eff ective cheating on N’s behalf has taken place (since 
eff ective cheating favoring other participants is ruled out by N’s win). Under plausible 
background assumptions, the same hypothesis of cheating-to-favor-N is confi rmed 
by all of N’s wins in a series of lotteries, but our expectation that N will win the 
next lottery fairly is not rationally increased by his winning the fi rst lottery, since the 
lotteries are independent if they are fair. Th is is why it is more reasonable to believe 
that cheating is occurring if N wins three diff erent 100-ticket lotteries than if N wins 
a single 1,000,000-ticket lottery.
Th e analysis thus far might raise the question as to whether conditioning on EA, EB, 
and EC seriatim is being treated as probabilistically diff erent from conditioning on 
7  Fogelin makes this independence quite clear when he fl eshes out Henry's stories as involving chance encounters. If 
Henry is telling the truth, he is not a celebrity chaser, nor does he have an advantageous job or a well-connected friend 
who helps him to meet celebrities. Rather, Henry presents himself as someone who has experienced an amazing series 
of coincidences. And it is upon this independence that Fogelin relies for the low prior so important to his analysis.
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their conjunction – (EA & EB & EC). From a Bayesian perspective, these should not 
diff er. Nor do they, in the abstract and for a logically omniscient being. However, it 
is extremely diffi  cult epistemically to access in the abstract the necessary information 
for making the shift in a single conditioning step. Th e probability distributions P*, 
P**, and P*** contain probabilities for complex conjunctions not represented, for 
reasons of space and clarity, in Table 1, as well as for those conjunctions represented 
in the table. Th ese include, for example, the conjunction (L & A & ~B & ~C) – that 
is, the proposition that Henry is indeed a liar but that some particular one of the 
three celebrity encounters did take place, the proposition (~L & A & ~B & ~C) – 
the proposition that Henry is not a liar and that some particular one of the celebrity 
encounters just happened to take place, and so forth. Each of these diff erent complex 
hypotheses constitutes a portion of the probability space in the initial distribution 
(though some can be bundled together initially), and those that have not been ruled 
out by the evidence receive a slice of the probability space in the fi nal distribution. 
But the fi nal probability for, e.g., (L & A & ~B & ~C) diff ers in specifi c ways from its 
initial probability as a result of the force of each part of the evidence – EA, EB, and EC 
– and its fi nal probability must therefore be calculated carefully by taking into account 
each piece of evidence. Indeed, the fi nal probability of the simple (and interesting) 
proposition L, conditional on all three stories, is evident only by way of calculations 
that take into account the eff ects of the various parts of the evidence on the complex 
sub-hypotheses contained in L, involving the truth and falsehood of various stories. It 
is not accessible by some simple calculation from the initial distribution P. 
It is, of course, relatively simple to calculate in hindsight the Bayes factor for the 
partition of L and ~L and for the conjuncted evidence (EA & EB & EC):
P(EA & EB & EC|L)
P(EA & EB & EC|~L)
Th is Bayes factor, given the probabilistic assumptions stated, must be approximately 
106.8 And it is clear from the reversion to approximate prior probabilities for the events 
in the fi nal distribution that the Bayes factor for the conjunctive evidence vis a vis each 
event (A, B, or C) must be very little better than a one to one ratio – in other words, that 
the evidence of all three stories together scarcely favors the occurrence of any one of the 
tales at all, for reasons we have already discussed. But these Bayes factors may well not 
be those we would have estimated were we attempting to look at the evidence in a single 
lump at the outset. In particular, the very high Bayes factor for the conjunction in favor 
of L may come as a surprise. It is quite easy to underestimate the cumulative force of 
evidence if we do not look at the evidence in its component parts. Th e epistemic path 
from P to P*** is thus made clear and accurate by not attempting to jump from one 
8  As implied in the text, this Bayes factor is backsolved. To do so, we use the odds form of Bayes's Th eorem, the 
stipulated probabilities for L and ~L prior to all the pieces of evidence, and the fi nal posteriors calculated for L and ~L 
in P***. In moving from a probability for L of .01 to one of .9999, we are moving from odds of 99 to 1 against L to 
odds of 9999 to 1 in favor of L. Th is is very nearly a shift from 100 to 1 odds against L to 10,000 to 1 odds in favor of 
L – six orders of magnitude.
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distribution to the other in one conditioning step but rather by considering in detail 
the eff ect of the evidence one piece at a time. Calculation by iterated conditioning 
steps on the separate parts of the evidence makes perspicuous the epistemic relations 
among the many sub-hypotheses and the various parts of the evidence which must 
obtain and which a logically omniscient being would understand readily. Th e iterated 
conditioning enables us to see the probabilistic relevance of the considerations already 
discussed – the carryover of confi rmation to L and the independence of A, B, and C 
and the consequent need for a more and more complex conjunction of independent 
encounters if Henry is to be entirely believed. In this way, too, the iterated conditioning 
is true to Fogelin’s description of the informal situation in which our opinion of Henry 
changes as he tells more and more tall tales.
  
5. Th e diff erence between the Henry case and a single improbable story
Th e analysis thus far should make it clear that no testimony to some single event, 
however initially improbable, can have all the probabilistically crucial features of the 
Henry case. Th is is because, contra Fogelin, the multiplicity of stories in the case of 
Henry does more than simply drive down the prior probability of their conjunction. 
Th e fact that Henry tells many diff erent, independent stories also fragments the 
evidence. Each story Henry tells confi rms only one event, while all the stories confi rm 
the hypothesis that Henry is a liar. Th e liar hypothesis can explain the stories just as 
well as does the occurrence of the events, and since it can explain all of the stories, while 
each event explains only one story, the liar hypothesis is overwhelmingly confi rmed by 
the entire evidence set.
Th ere is no parallel to this situation when a witness testifi es to some single event, such 
as, for example, to having met the resurrected Jesus. In any single case, we have to deal 
with a much simpler probabilistic situation as we set up a conditioning step: In order 
to decide whether and to what extent the testimony confi rms the event, we need to 
decide whether and to what extent the testimony is more to be expected if that single 
event occurred than if it didn’t. Where M is some ostensibly miraculous event and T is 
testimony to that event, the question in the individual case for deciding the strength of 
the evidence is the size of the Bayes factor, the ratio
P (T|M)
P (T|~M).
Th is Bayes factor may favor the event overwhelmingly, slightly, or not at all, but its 
weight is not determined by the prior probability of M.
To say that this situation is probabilistically “simple” is, of course, to speak only of the 
formal representation in the form of a single Bayes factor for a single event. Th e evaluation 
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or even estimation of that Bayes factor is not automatically a simple epistemic matter. 
Indeed, once it is acknowledged that priors are not the whole story in the evaluation of 
testimony to extraordinary stories, the focus naturally shifts to the question of how we 
should rightly estimate the Bayes factor. In cases of testimony from long ago, skeptics 
will understandably raise the additional question of whether witnesses really testifi ed to 
the event at all or whether the putative testimony is a later, invented story by someone 
who could not have been a witness. Th e example of the resurrection is used here merely 
as an example of a single miraculous (hence, antecedently improbable) event to which 
we might receive testimony, as opposed to a series of independent improbable events, 
and specifi c questions of New Testament textual scholarship obviously lie beyond the 
scope of this paper. (See McGrew and McGrew 2009, 597-604 for some discussion of 
these issues.) 
Indeed, it is precisely when we have recognized the importance of the force of specifi c 
evidence, as opposed to mere prior improbability, that purely historical investigation 
comes into its own. Th is recognition, too, should make clear the insuffi  ciency of any 
“trial by proxy,” such as Hume indulges in in Part II of his essay, for evaluating testimony 
to some improbable tale. Th at is to say, it is not enough to show that other stories, 
vaguely similar to the story one really wishes to attack, are not credible (see McGrew 
and McGrew 2009, 653-8). Th e strength of a Bayes factor for some specifi c testimonial 
evidence will depend upon a host of particulars whose evaluation cannot be avoided 
(see McGrew and McGrew 2012, 57-62).9 Th us the evaluation of the evidence in the 
case of the resurrection or any other specifi c miracle claim must be the subject of actual 
investigation of those claims, not of claims to entirely diff erent miracles.
Returning to Henry’s stories, we can see that Henry’s fi rst story confi rmed both the 
event and the hypothesis that Henry is a liar, though that confi rmation did not move 
either hypothesis to a very high posterior probability. In some other case, including cases 
involving testimony to the miraculous, the Bayes factor might favor the occurrence of 
the event even more strongly over its negation than it does here.10 Everything depends 
on the specifi cs of the evidential situation, but since only one conditioning step is 
involved concerning only one putative event M, there is no question of multiple 
confi rmations of the hypothesis that the witness is a liar by various pieces of evidence 
which can be accounted for (on the side of M) only by further elaborations of M.
9  For example, if witnesses claim to have seen and spoken with someone who was previously dead, we would like 
to evaluate how close they were to the person when they supposedly recognized him and under what other conditions 
(physical and psychological) these meetings supposedly occurred, how extensive and detailed these alleged encounters 
were, how many people were allegedly present at them, how well they knew the person before, what resources and mo-
tives someone else would have had for tricking them, and what motives the witnesses have for lying, telling the truth, 
or remaining silent. If an extraordinary healing is claimed, we understandably want to examine the evidence concerning 
whether the person was really ill in the way stated prior to the alleged healing, how closely he was examined (and by 
whom) afterwards, whether the alleged healing was permanent, and what natural explanations might account for the 
healing.
10  As noted above, Henry suff ers no extreme penalty for his stories, even when people disbelieve him. If a witness is 
under severe duress to recant but sticks to his story, this usually makes his story at least somewhat more valuable than 
testimony from a witness under no duress, especially if he was in a position to know about the event to which he at-
tests.
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6. Conclusion
It is unfortunate that defenders of Hume try so hard to place their entire case on the 
priors. It seems that one possible reason for this is a distaste for the nitty-gritty of 
historical particularity. Th e Humean approach presents the opponent of miracles with 
the opportunity to avoid what Earman (2000, 61) calls “diffi  cult and delicate empirical 
investigations.” But while Bayesian probability theory does not all by itself tell us what 
probability – either prior or posterior – we should rationally assign to the occurrence of 
any putative miracle, it does tell us that prior probabilities are not the whole story.
Th e Henry case is, as Fogelin uses it, yet another attempt to sidestep the importance 
of anything other than the prior improbability of a miracle and to imply by vague 
reference to a “reverse method” that any suffi  ciently improbable story merely casts 
doubt on the veracity of the person telling it and may therefore be disregarded. Th e 
above analysis shows that the Henry example does not fulfi ll that purpose, for two 
reasons. First, testimonial evidence can lower our confi dence in a witness’s credibility 
while at the same time confi rming the event testifi ed to. Second, the proper analysis 
of the Henry example depends critically on the complex nature of the evidence as it 
relates both to the separate encounters and to the hypothesis that Henry is a liar, and 
that analysis will not apply to an attestation to a single event.
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